The bombing of the Abu al-Duhur military airport in the Idlib countryside on August 18 was not merely another raid by the Jewish entity on Syria’s territory. The Jewish entity targeted the site with eight strikes at a time when Turkiye’s role in rebuilding the Syrian military establishment was expanding—and given that the airport lies just 60 to 80 kilometers from the Turkish border. The Jewish entity explicitly linked the strike to a potential Turkish military presence; Netanyahu stated that Damascus was nearing a decision to allow Turkish forces to deploy at the base—a move the Jewish entity viewed as a security threat—though both Ankara and Damascus denied the existence of any such deployment. (Al Jazeera Net, August 19, 2026)

On the surface, the bombing appeared to be part of an escalating struggle for influence within Syria; indeed, many media analyses portrayed it as a sign of an impending confrontation between the Jewish entity and Türkiye. With growing military cooperation between Ankara and Damascus, and the prospect of Türkiye contributing to the development of Syrian military capabilities, Syria’s territory had become a testing ground for the limits of influence between the two parties.

However, the most significant development was not military, but political. Reports revealed that Mossad Director Roman Gofman had contacted Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani on August 14—days before the Abu al-Duhur bombing—with the Turkish military presence in Syria serving as one of the topics of discussion. Then, just a few days after the bombing, Al-Shaibani himself met with the Mossad director in a high-level meeting in Jordan dedicated to discussing de-escalation. (Al-Arabiya, August 23, 2026).

Here lies a paradox worth noting: if the bombing of Abu al-Duhur was intended—according to the narrative of the Jewish entity—to prevent the expansion of Turkish influence in Syria, one of its most significant political consequences was pushing Damascus toward a direct channel of communication with Tel Aviv, culminating in a meeting between its foreign minister and the head of the Mossad. Consequently, the question is not merely about the nature of the military objective, but about the political trajectory that opened up in its wake: was the de-escalation merely a security measure to contain a fleeting incident, or was it a step in a broader process to gradually integrate Syria into a network of understandings with the Jewish entity?

This question gains further significance when considering the nature of the relationship between Türkiye and the Jewish entity itself. Türkiye is a member of the crusader NATO alliance, yet it simultaneously maintains official relations with the Jewish entity—relations it did not sever even during the Jewish entity's war on Gaza, despite the sharp escalation in its political rhetoric against it. This highlights a fundamental principle in analyzing international relations: politics is not measured solely by slogans and public statements, but by what transpires behind closed doors and what evolves from those discussions into practical political paths.

From this perspective, it is essential to view with caution the image often portrayed by the media of an imminent confrontation between Türkiye and the Jewish entity. While the struggle for influence may be real, and the interests of both parties in Syria may clash, this does not necessarily mean the ultimate outcome will be an open confrontation. Türkiye and the Jewish entity possess—simultaneously—channels of communication and intertwined interests; they operate within the same regional and international order, with the US remaining a central player in managing the region's balance of power.

It is in this context that Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s remarks regarding the construction of a new regional system take on particular importance. If this security framework is predicated on restructuring regional relations and power dynamics, then integrating the Jewish entity into it does not appear impossible; indeed, it may well be a possibility currently being pursued deliberately and without haste. In this scenario, Türkiye’s conflict with the Jewish entity is not necessarily contradictory to the normalization process. Instead, it could become a factor that reshuffles roles and compels the parties to negotiate the new rules of influence—particularly if the US, through its regional proxies, succeeds in encircling Iran’s proxies.

It is striking that Syria—once a state that loudly championed the “Resistance” narrative—finds itself, following the fall of the tyrant Bashar Al-Assad, facing a reality of even greater subservience and capitulation under the “political acumen” of its new rulers. Strikes by the Jewish entity on Syria’s soil continue with greater intensity, Turkish influence is expanding within the country, Russia maintains its presence, and the US manages the balance of power—all while Syria itself has begun engaging in direct contacts with Tel Aviv! Thus, the issue is no longer merely about determining who holds military sway over a specific base or region, but rather defining Syria’s stance within the new regional order.

Consequently, the bombing of Abu al-Duhur can be interpreted within a context that transcends the military strike itself. It targeted a site associated with potential Turkish influence, yet coincided with Syrian security contacts with the Jewish entity, ultimately leading to a public meeting between the Syrian Foreign Minister and the head of the Mossad. In politics, such tangible outcomes can be far more significant than the escalation of heated rhetoric between the parties.

Accordingly, the question raised by these developments is not simply: Are we facing an imminent confrontation between Türkiye and the Jewish entity on Syria’s soil? Moreover, are we witnessing a restructuring of the conflict itself—one that pushes Syria toward the negotiating table with the Jewish entity, within a new regional framework where the interests of Türkiye, the Jewish entity, and the United States converge?

For what is said publicly is one matter, while what transpires behind closed doors is quite another. Ultimately, what matters is not the slogans raised by states and their rulers, but the policies they actually implement. If the targeting of Abu al-Duhur has resulted in bringing Damascus closer to a direct line of communication with Tel Aviv, then the crucial issue is not merely identifying who was targeted by the bombardment. Instead, it is understanding the political trajectory into which the aftermath has pushed the region, and determining who stands to benefit from this path—both in reshaping the future of Syria and the region, and in weakening the peoples of the area at a time when the Ummah yearns to regain its strength and unity more than ever before.

There is no way to halt the train of normalization with this monstrous Jewish entity—or to hold traitorous rulers accountable for their crimes—save for the establishment of the Second Khilafah Rashidah (rightly-guided Caliphate) on the method of the Prophethood. It is this Khilafah (Caliphate) that will uproot the Jewish entity, liberate the Blessed Land, and restore the homeland to its rightful people. Allah (swt) said,

[وَنُرِيدُ أَن نَّمُنَّ عَلَى الَّذِينَ اسْتُضْعِفُوا فِي الْأَرْضِ وَنَجْعَلَهُمْ أَئِمَّةً وَنَجْعَلَهُمُ الْوَارِثِينَ]

“And We wanted to confer favor upon those who were oppressed in the land and make them leaders and make them inheritors.” [TMQ Surah Al-Qasas: 5].