Between Missiles of Rhetoric and Geopolitical Realities: Where Is Turkey’s Relationship With the Jewish Entity Headed?
(Translated)
Al-Rayah Newspaper - Issue 604 - 17/06/2026
By: Engineer Wissam Al-Atrash

While Turkish President Erdogan escalates his rhetoric against the Jewish entity, warning against the “illusions of the Promised Land” and asserting that Turkey’s security begins not in Hatay but in Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut (Al Jazeera, June 10, 2026), the region appears to be facing a scenario that suggests Ankara and Tel Aviv are moving in opposite directions, preparing for an inevitable confrontation. The language used is unprecedented in its intensity, and the mutual accusations transcend traditional disputes, reaching the level of a struggle over visions of the regional future.

However, politics cannot be interpreted solely through speeches, but also through the deep-seated orientations of state institutions, military alliances, and long-term geopolitical posturing.

Herein lies the real question: Do Erdoğan's statements reflect a strategic shift that removes Turkey from the system that the Jewish entity is striving to become a regional pillar of, or do they represent a political management of a complex contradiction between domestic demands and the realities of geopolitical positioning? How can we understand this escalation of rhetoric just a week after his Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan, spoke of a regional security architecture stretching from Pakistan to the Gulf, encompassing Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Gulf states, with the potential later inclusion of Iran and the Jewish entity, provided they recognize a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders?

To answer this question, we must first distinguish between two different levels of analysis: the level of political discourse and the level of a state’s strategic positioning. States often clash on the level of language while continuing to operate within the same frameworks that unite them. The recent history of relations between Türkiye and the Jewish entity provides a clear example of this paradox.

The relationship between them did not begin with Erdoğan, nor was it ever merely a fleeting diplomatic connection. Turkey officially recognized the Jewish entity in 1949. It then joined NATO in 1952, which led to an influx of thousands of Pentagon experts into Turkey, bringing with them the West Point military doctrine based on the idea of perpetual tension, and the creation of foreign enemies to maintain a state of alert. Turkey has remained an ally and protégé of the United States ever since.

In the 1990s, one of the most important axes of military cooperation in the Middle East was forged between Ankara and Tel Aviv. In 1996, they signed extensive defense agreements encompassing intelligence cooperation, military training, the modernization of Turkish military equipment, and joint exercises. This was not simply a tactical rapprochement, but instead a reflection of a broader American vision that considered both Turkey and the Jewish entity as two fundamental pillars of the regional order that emerged after the end of the Cold War.

Secret diplomatic reports revealed that Uri Lubrani, the coordinator of the Jewish activities in Lebanon and the Mossad’s point man on the Lebanese issue, was one of the unknown soldiers behind the drafting of the security agreement between Turkey and the Jewish entity. Uri Lubrani was also an expert on Iran, and Rabin tasked him in 1990 with overseeing Turkish affairs. The strategic deal between Ankara and Tel Aviv is the culmination of a comprehensive series of military cooperation steps, including the establishment of an intelligence and surveillance network along the borders with Syria and Iran. While the military agreement between Ankara and Tel Aviv was brokered by Schiller during Shimon Peres’s presidency, Netanyahu imbued it with a confrontational tone towards Syria, exploiting the escalating water crisis between Syria and Turkey. He was actively working to weaken Syria, in line with the desires of the Jewish deep state, a fact documented in Jewish military literature. This is whilst the Jewish entity formed the cornerstone of the Greater Middle East Project announced at a conference held in Istanbul in 2003.

However, the more important question is not whether the alliance of the 1990s still exists in its original form, but instead whether the structural conditions that produced it have truly disappeared. The answer seems less clear than political rhetoric suggests. In March 2022, the president of the Jewish entity, Isaac Herzog, visited Turkey, where Erdoğan rolled out the red carpet for him and received him like a leader and a hero!

Then, in September 2023, Erdoğan met with the prime minister of the Jewish entity, Netanyahu, in New York on the sidelines of the 78th session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Turkish Presidency reported that Erdoğan discussed international and regional issues with Netanyahu, in addition to political and economic relations between the two sides, and the latest developments related to the Jewish-Palestinian conflict. Erdoğan emphasized the need to work together for a world of peace, noting that areas of cooperation between Turkey and the Jewish entity include energy, technology, innovation, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity. Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar was even scheduled to visit Tel Aviv in November 2023 to discuss energy cooperation, but the events of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood prevented the completion of this treacherous plan and disrupted its implementation.

Regardless, Turkey remains a pivotal member of NATO, its defense industries are still integrated to varying degrees into the Western technological and security environment, and its political leadership continues to emphasize the importance of the Atlantic alliance as a fundamental framework for its national security. It is noteworthy that Erdoğan’s fiery statements against the Jewish entity coincided with his public welcoming of US President Trump’s participation in the upcoming NATO summit in Ankara, considering his presence an important step for the stability of this crusader alliance (Anadolu Agency, 10 June 2026). This is not merely a matter of protocol.

In the world of geopolitics, a nation’s true priorities are revealed through the alliances it maintains during times of turmoil, not through the rhetoric it employs in public forums. While Turkey simultaneously affirms its commitment to the Western security architecture, the Jewish entity remains a constant component of Western strategy toward the Middle East.

Meanwhile, Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin traveled to Egypt, seemingly oblivious to the events unfolding in Gaza. But why? To negotiate with Hamas regarding its disarmament, emphasizing that implementing Trump’s plan to disarm the resistance would contribute to restoring lasting calm in Gaza (Youm7, 9 June 2026).

This glaring contradiction between words and deeds makes us look at Erdogan's recent statements from a different perspective.

All of this does not necessarily reflect a readiness for a direct confrontation with the Jewish entity, but instead an attempt to manage a highly volatile regional environment. Ankara is watching the ongoing transformations in Syria, Lebanon, and the Eastern Mediterranean with evident concern, realizing that any reshaping of regional balances will directly affect its position and influence. It also fears the potential consequences of a war against Iran should the US fail to manage the conflict. At the same time, it understands that the Turkish public, like large segments of Islamic public opinion, views the war in Gaza and the Jewish policies as a moral and political test that cannot be ignored. Here, the domestic and foreign dimensions converge, and the mobilization rhetoric is juxtaposed with the military inaction regarding supporting Gaza and Lebanon, just as Syria was previously abandoned.

Therefore, the heightened rhetoric against the Jewish entity gives the Turkish leadership the ability to contain popular Islamic anger and limits the ability of rival Islamic forces to monopolize the cause of Palestine, which they are secretly and openly failing to address. It also enhances Turkey's image as a defender of regional issues. However, it does not necessarily alter the structural realities that govern Turkey’s position within the international order.

Indeed, the region is likely heading toward a phase of broad restructuring of alliances, which may push Western powers, particularly the United States, to seek new security formulas that accommodate the major regional powers instead of leaving them in a state of perpetual mutual attrition. In such a case, the question becomes not whether Ankara and Tel Aviv differ today, but whether their interests might converge tomorrow within broader arrangements under the banner of the “Abrahamic Middle East.”

From this perspective, the exchange of verbal attacks may be less significant than they appear. History teaches us that what determines the future of relations between states is not the level of political noise, but instead the direction in which deep-seated interests are moving. So far, these interests do not indicate Turkey's departure from the order to which it belongs, but instead an attempt to renegotiate its position within it. This is why a convergence between Turkey and the Jewish entity at a later stage, however unlikely it may seem in the current climate of war, remains a possibility that cannot be dismissed in the geopolitical calculations of the Middle East.